Does Nuclear Deterrence Work in Today’s Multipolar World?
The year 2024 is marked by rising global tensions and significant elections. The Russia-Ukraine war rages on, fears of a full-scale war in the Middle East involving Israel and Iran are mounting, and. US voters elected Donald Trump for his second term of presidency - a decision that could reshape NATO’s nuclear umbrella and with it European security.
In this fragile environment, debates on military spending and nuclear security have gained renewed importance. For nearly 80 years, humanity has lived under the spectre of nuclear weapons, their existence justified by deterrence. Yet, the nuclear landscape today has evolved far beyond its Cold War roots. In a multipolar world of nine nuclear-armed nations - four outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty - and Iran being a “threshold state”, can deterrence still be a credible guardian against conflict?
Theoretical Justification
Nuclear Deterrence Theory, supported by strategists Kenneth Waltz and Thomas Schelling, emerged during the Cold War to address the existential threat of nuclear weapons. Deterrence, derived from the Latin word "terrere," meaning "to terrify," holds that nuclear-armed states refrain from attacking one another due to the risk of catastrophic retaliation, a principle known as "mutually assured destruction".
The theory is based on two core assumptions:
States can credibly convince adversaries of their readiness to use nuclear weapons if necessary, embedding the threat of nuclear conflict within the theory itself.
Decision-makers are rational actors who act in predictable, self-preserving ways.
Evaluation of the Theory
Despite the theory gaining major support during the Cold War, its reliance on a rational leader who acts in the best interest of its citizens is fragile, given that it is simply irresponsible to place the faith of millions at the mercy of individual judgement. Critics such as Melissa Parke, Executive Director of ICAN, warn that the theory
“cannot deter accidents, miscalculations, unhinged leaders, terrorist groups, cyber-attacks or simple mistakes”.
History has similarly highlighted these flaws. There have been at least 13 documented “close calls” with nuclear weapons, the most famous being the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis - a standoff that brought the world to the brink of nuclear catastrophe. Former U.S Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara, described the event as a mutual miscalculation, cautioning,
“There will be no learning period with nuclear weapons. Make one mistake and you’re going to destroy nations”.
Whether the “balance of terror” between the two superpowers, the U.S. and the USSR truly prevented the escalation of the Cold War remains debated. Yet, the proven potential for mistakes in a bipolar context demonstrates the unreliability of nuclear deterrence in today’s multipolar world, where complex alliances and a growing number of nuclear-armed states, increase the potential of catastrophic miscalculations.
Nuclear Deterrence Today
The long-standing “nuclear taboo” which once discouraged any mention of deploying nuclear weapons, appears to be eroding as rhetoric around their use grows louder in political and public discourse. Since 2022, Putin has repeatedly threatened the West with employing Russia’s nuclear capabilities. Arguably the strongest was his most recent warning to extend the preconditions of the use of nuclear arsenal to a conventional attack by a non-nuclear state, considering it as a “joint attack” if in an alliance with a nuclear power, expanding the circumstances for a potential nuclear response.
Russia isn’t alone. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has threatened South Korea to use “without hesitation all of the offensive forces it has possessed, including nuclear weapons”, if it were to encroach on North’s. Since Pyongyang’s withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 2003, it has repeatedly tested its nuclear arms, most recently demonstrating it’s intercontinental ballistic missile capability to strike US mainland. Even Iran, a “threshold nuclear state”, has recently signalled its preparedness to adjust its nuclear doctrine, if faced with an existential threat.
While nuclear stockpiles have arguably kept Russia from attacking NATO members and supply lines into Ukraine, and deterred NATO from joining the Ukrainian war on the ground, the rising nuclear rhetoric signals a shift around perceptions of the “nuclear taboo”. Analysts warn of the “contagious” nature of these narratives, potentially amplifying irrationality in nuclear policy. The overt nuclear posturing poses a critical test for nuclear deterrence, as one third of nuclear players appear increasingly willing to entertain nuclear options as conventional solutions to war. This “normalisation” trend creates mistrust among states, at a time where global cohesion is most needed, with nuclear spending being up by 13% to a record of 91.4 billion in 2023.
The Complex Future of Nuclear Deterrence
In today’s multipolar world, the theory of nuclear deterrence faces unprecedented challenges. Once considered a stable, if tense, peacekeeping tool, the Cold War’s simpler “balance of terror” no longer applies to nine countries - four outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty - possessing nuclear arsenals. The increased nuclear rhetoric from Russia, North Korea and Iran underscores how nuclear weapons are re-entering policy discourse as tools of political coercion, eroding the restraint that once underpinned deterrence. The normalisation of nuclear threats, makes deterrence less about stability and more about managing escalating risks, in a world where rationality cannot be assumed.
Ultimately, as international nuclear spending hits new highs and global divisions deepen, Gorbachev’s words resonate more than ever:
“Nuclear deterrence has always been a hard and brittle guarantor of peace… nuclear powers are promoting through inaction a future in which nuclear weapons will inevitably be used. That catastrophe must be forestalled.”
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